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Mandelson Was Cleared Against UK Vetting Advice. Parliament Still Cannot See Why

By opengovt
16 July 2026

On 28 January 2025, UK Security Vetting recommended that Peter Mandelson should not receive Developed Vetting clearance for his new job as Britain's ambassador to the United States.

The following day, the Foreign Office granted it anyway.

That decision was permitted under the system then in place. Unlike many departments, the Foreign Office could make its own final decision after receiving UKSV's assessment. But more than a year later, Parliament still does not have the record showing in detail why the recommendation was rejected or what security measures were imposed as a result.

The Foreign Affairs Committee reached that conclusion after taking evidence from senior officials and examining more than 1,500 pages released by the government. Its report, published on 9 July, found a wider absence of records covering both Mandelson's selection and the decision to clear him.

Mandelson's appointment had been announced on 20 December 2024. The government said at the time that the King had approved it on the recommendation of Prime Minister Keir Starmer and then Foreign Secretary David Lammy. Mandelson began work in Washington on 10 February 2025.

Security vetting did not begin until 23 December, three days after the announcement. That was not in itself outside the practice then used for external government appointments. Former Cabinet Secretary Sir Chris Wormald told MPs that security clearance would normally take place after an appointment was announced but before the person took up the post, with the appointment conditional on clearance. Starmer has since changed that policy so appointments cannot be announced before the required vetting is completed.

The more serious problem emerged when the vetting was completed.

UKSV carried out its checks between 23 December and 28 January, including two interviews with Mandelson. On 28 January its vetting officer recommended that Developed Vetting should be denied. On 29 January, Sir Olly Robbins, who had become the Foreign Office permanent under-secretary nine days earlier, agreed that Mandelson should receive clearance after an oral briefing from the department's security director.

Robbins told the committee that he never saw the UKSV document itself. He said he had been told that Mandelson was a "borderline" case, with UKSV leaning towards refusing clearance, but that Foreign Office security officials believed the most serious risks could be managed or mitigated. He also said the concerns put to him did not relate to Jeffrey Epstein.

The UKSV recommendation was advisory rather than binding on the Foreign Office, which is why that account carries weight. Robbins disputed descriptions of the department as having simply "overruled" a failed vetting process. His evidence was that UKSV identified the risks and made a recommendation, while the Foreign Office remained responsible for deciding whether those risks could be managed.

The government's own account nevertheless confirms that the recommendation was for clearance to be denied.

A Downing Street document published in April records that Cabinet Office permanent secretary Cat Little examined the UKSV file in March 2026 and discovered that the vetting officer had recommended against granting Mandelson clearance. It says the Foreign Office had exercised its discretion and cleared him anyway. At that stage Little had not seen an audit trail explaining the basis for the decision.

The same document records that Starmer was told on 14 April 2026. It says he had previously been unaware that UKSV had recommended against clearance, or even that the Foreign Office could grant clearance contrary to its recommendation. No evidence had then been found that the decision had been disclosed outside the Foreign Office and UKSV.

Robbins said there was a record of the 29 January decision and of the measures intended to manage the risks. Former FCDO security director Ian Collard also recalled such a record. The committee had not been given it when it completed its report.

Nor had MPs been shown notes explaining how the mitigations were agreed or records of discussions with Mandelson or others responsible for making sure they were followed. Some documents relating to vetting, conflicts of interest and internal correspondence have been withheld at the request of the Metropolitan Police because of its separate criminal investigation. The committee said relevant papers should be published once that investigation allows it.

That distinction is important. The evidence does not establish that no security safeguards existed. It establishes that the committee has not been able to examine the evidence needed to judge whether they were adequate.

The Metropolitan Police investigation concerns suspected misconduct in public office arising from allegations about information Mandelson passed to Jeffrey Epstein during his earlier time in government. It is an ongoing criminal investigation and does not amount to a finding of guilt.

There are separate gaps in the record of how Mandelson got the ambassador's job in the first place.

Cabinet Secretary Simon Case had advised Starmer in November 2024 that, if he wanted a political rather than career diplomat as ambassador, officials would arrange the necessary security clearance and due diligence before his choice was confirmed. The Cabinet Office's Propriety and Ethics Team subsequently examined Mandelson and George Osborne, apparently leaving two political candidates under consideration in early December.

The committee found no written record showing how Mandelson emerged as the preferred candidate, no surviving response from Starmer to Case's advice and no record of the meeting at which Starmer decided to appoint him. Starmer subsequently told Parliament that he made the decision on 18 December.

Sir Philip Barton, then permanent under-secretary and head of the Diplomatic Service, first learned that Mandelson had been selected on 15 December. He told MPs that he had not been asked for his view and was instead instructed to deal with the practical steps needed to implement the decision.

The committee also said the Foreign Secretary had not been formally consulted as part of the appointment process, although Morgan McSweeney, Starmer's former chief of staff, gave evidence that Lammy had several conversations with the Prime Minister about the appointment and that everyone involved could see there were risks. The government's December announcement later described the appointment as having been recommended to the King by both Starmer and Lammy.

By the time Robbins arrived at the Foreign Office on 20 January, the King had approved the appointment, the US government had accepted Mandelson as ambassador, he had access to the Foreign Office building and basic government IT, and he was receiving highly classified briefings case by case. Officials were told to make clear during meetings that he did not yet have Developed Vetting.

Robbins described a "generally dismissive attitude" towards the vetting process in Number 10 and an expectation that Mandelson should reach Washington quickly for Donald Trump's return to office. He also described "constant chasing" of the Foreign Office.

McSweeney rejected the suggestion that Number 10 had asked officials to lower their standards. He told the committee that Downing Street wanted the process completed quickly but never instructed anybody to skip steps. Robbins and Collard also said the pressure did not alter their professional judgement on the security decision.

The appointment was not unprecedented simply because Mandelson was a political choice. Governments have previously appointed politicians to senior diplomatic positions, including Paul Boateng as High Commissioner to South Africa and Ed Llewellyn as ambassador to France. The law allows ministers to make such appointments without the normal Civil Service competition.

The process used for Mandelson has already been changed. The government has formalised due diligence for direct political appointments, Starmer has said the required security clearance must now be obtained before an appointment is announced, and the Foreign Office's ability to take the final DV decision contrary to UKSV advice was suspended after Mandelson's case came to light.

The Foreign Affairs Committee wants further changes, including a defined procedure for political ambassadorial appointments, access for the hiring department to the due diligence report and scrutiny of future political candidates by MPs. It has proposed that the committee should be able to veto a political appointment to a head of mission post.

Its most basic finding concerns the records that should already exist.

The committee found no audit trail showing how Mandelson became the preferred candidate. For the later security decision, Robbins says a record explaining the clearance and its mitigations exists, but it has not been published. Other potentially relevant documents may currently be held back because of the police investigation.

After more than 1,500 pages of disclosures, Parliament can establish that UKSV recommended denying Mandelson Developed Vetting on 28 January 2025 and that Robbins approved clearance the following day. It still cannot examine the full record showing why that decision was taken and precisely how the identified risks were supposed to be managed.