DCMS · DCMS_0118_2223-Q1
Department page: Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
| Data as at | Rating | End date | Whole-life cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| March 2024 | Amber (NISTA's independent assessment) | 31 March 2025 | £310m (price basis not stated) |
| March 2025 | Amber (NISTA's independent assessment) | 31 March 2026 | £310m (price basis not stated) |
| March 2026 | Amber (the department's own assessment) | Mid: 31/03/2028, High: 31/03/2028 | £360.15m (in 2024/25 prices) |
Each year’s cost is shown with its price basis. Costs are not compared between years: the March 2024 and March 2025 reports state no price basis, and from March 2026 costs are in 2024/25 prices.
This is the department’s own commentary. It may use different prices from the table above, so its figures may not match.
Rating: Compared to financial year 24/25 Q4, the NISTA/SRO Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at 25/26 Q4 the programme improved it's delivery confidence rating to Amber. This is primarily due to the following factors‚ the majority of projects within the programme have now been completed with the remainder due to be complete within the first half of the next financial year. This means we can be more confident that the last part of the year we are likely to deliver the programme's expected benefits.
Schedule: Compared to financial year 24/25-Q4, the project's end-date at 25/26-Q4 increased from last year's published end-date to this year's published end-date, 31 March 2028. This is primarily due to the inclusion of the MMC workstream in the programme, end dates of which have slipped into 2026/27 FY; and the delivery of our benefits realisation programme then supports projects being financially viable one year after opening.
Cost: Compared to financial year 24/25-Q4, the project's departmentally agreed Whole Life Cost at 25/26-Q4 (measured in £m) increased from last year's WLC 316.94m to 354.58m. This is primarily due to the actual costs for 25/26 and forecasted costs for 26/27 being accounted. Please note figures referenced in the narratives were entered as nominal and the system automatically converts them to Real Terms.
Rating: Compared to financial year 23/24-Q4, the Infrastructure Project Authority's Delivery Confidence Assessment rating at 24/25-Q4 remained at AMBER. This is primarily due to the following factors‚ some projects not being complete by the 31/03/25. This has meant that the programme has been extended to 31/03/2026 and therefore the projects within our delivery pipeline are still on-going.
Schedule: Compared to financial year 23/24-Q4, the project's end-date at 24/25-Q4 increased from 31/03/2025 to 31/03/2026. This is primarily due to the following factors‚ some projects not completing by 31/03/2025 due to delays as a result of protracted legal due diligence activities, time lost on construction sites as a result of poor weather/ground conditions and over optimism on the behalf of grantees and the sub-contractors with their scheduling.
Cost: Compared to financial year 23/24-Q4, the project's departmentally agreed Whole Life Cost at 24/25-Q4 (measured in £m) remained at 310. This is primarily due to the following factors‚ in-year variance relating to slippage of some projects rather than genuine underspends. The projects will be completed to the same overall budget, but in 2025/26 rather than 2024/25 with the programme's lifecycle extended accordingly.
Source: NISTA Annual Report 2024-25 (data)
Rating: The Infrastructure Project Authority's Delivery Confidence Assessment rating at 23/24-Q4 is Amber. This is primarily due to the following factors. This is primarily due to YIF’s spend profile and timescales being too compressed to deliver all of its projects. However, to address this we are revising our Full Business Case (FBC) to seek a limited amount of funding beyond this date to support the forecast of a small number of projects extending into 2025/26. Quantifying this is work in progress.
Schedule: The project's end-date at 23/24-Q4 is 2025-03-31. This is primarily due to the following factors. The fund's progress has diverged from the original spend profile which was agreed in 2022. This is due to a combination of factors, including that the original spend profile was misaligned with the usual profile of a large capital portfolio, a lack of shovel-ready projects available to bid into the fund at the onset, delays in the planning system, the capacity and capability of some grantees to manage their projects, and the amount of legal diligence needed to assure the projects before construction could commence. The latest FBC applies adjustments to forecasts to learn from the previous experience of managing the fund, allow for risk and inherent optimism, and provide an appropriate level of contingency. This, together with an enhanced level of centrally-provided professional project management support to grantees, and the fact that the vast majority of projects will shortly have started on site, gives significantly greater confidence in the revised timescales.
Cost: Compared to financial year 22/23-Q4, the project's departmental-agree Whole Life Cost at 23/24-Q4 decreased from 341m. to 310m. This is primarily due to the following factors: The whole life costs are under constant review. With up to 300 individual projects the costs are demand led and monitored by the intermediary grant maker.
Source: IPA Annual Report 2023-24 (data)
Names, figures, dates, ratings and commentary are as the department reported them. Where a rating, cost or date is withheld, the file’s wording is shown. Every major project →